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Abstract—Consider a two-way communication scenario where
two single-antenna nodes, operating under full-duplex mode,
exchange information to one another through the aid of a
(full-duplex) multi-antenna relay, and there is another single-
antenna node who intends to eavesdrop. The relay employs
artificial noise (AN) to interfere the eavesdropper’s channel, and
amplify-forward (AF) Alamouti-based rank-two beamforming
to establish the two-way communication links of the legitimate
nodes. Our problem is to optimize the rank-two beamformer
and AN covariance for sum secrecy rate maximization (SSRM).
This SSRM problem is nonconvex, and we develop an efficient
solution approach using semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and
minorization-maximization (MM). We prove that SDR is tight
for the SSRM problem and thus introduces no loss. Also, we
consider an inexact MM method where an approximately but
computationally cheap MM solution update is used in place of
the exact update in conventional MM. We show that this inexact
MM method guarantees convergence to a stationary solution to
the SSRM problem. The effectiveness of our proposed approach
is further demonstrated by an energy-harvesting scenario
extension, and by extensive simulation results.
Index terms− Physical-layer security, full-duplex relay,
minorization-maximization, semidefinite relaxation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent advances of self-interference cancellation
techniques, full-duplex (FD) communication has received re-
newed interest. Particularly, FD has been seen as a promising
physical-layer technology to meet the explosive data require-
ment for the future 5G mobile networks [1]. In contrast to
frequency-division duplex (FDD) and time-division duplex
(TDD), FD has the potential to double the spectral efficiency
by simultaneously transmitting and receiving (STR) over the
same radio-frequency (RF) bands. FD also provides new op-
portunities for system designs to achieve some specific goals,
such as physical-layer (PHY) security [2]–[10] and simulta-
neous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) [11]–
[14].
PHY security is an information theoretic approach for
providing information security at the PHY layer by exploiting
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the difference between the decoding abilities of the target user
and eavesdropper. An effective way to deliver PHY security
is to adopt the so-called artificial noise (AN) approach, where
the transmitter intentionally generates noise to jam the eaves-
dropper. Interestingly, with FD STR transceivers, we can apply
AN even more effectively. In [2], the authors exploit the full
duplexity of the target user to simultaneously receive informa-
tion and transmit AN. Motivated by the aforementioned work,
PHY security using FD has received considerable attention.
Specifically, the work [3] analyzed the secure degrees of
freedom in FD point-to-point transmission. For FD two-way
secure communications, robust and low-complexity transmit
solutions have been developed in [4] and [5], respectively.
In [6] and [7], the authors considered secrecy designs in
cellular networks with an FD base station (BS) and multiple
half-duplex uplink/downlink mobile users. For both of these
works, the semidefinite relaxation-based approach was em-
ployed either to maximize the downlink secrecy rate [6] or
to minimize the uplink/downlink transmission powers under
secrecy rate constraints [7]. FD relay secure communication
has also gained much interest [8]–[10]. In [8], the authors
considered one-way FD secure relay networks, where two
operation modes of the FD relay are considered, namely full-
duplex transmission (FDT) and full-duplex jamming (FDJ). A
secrecy outage probability comparison between FDT and FDJ
was conducted in [9], and the result reveals that FDJ is more
suitable for the small target secrecy rate regime. Extension to a
multi-hop FD relay network has also been considered in [10].
Apart from PHY security, another emerging application of
full duplexity is SWIPT. SWIPT is a means of using RF signals
to achieve dual transmission of information and energy; read-
ers are referred to the recent magazine paper [15] for a more
complete treatment of this kind of technique. With the FD
capability, a communication node can simultaneously receive
information from and broadcast energy to other nodes, or do
the opposite. Under this new information-energy paradigm,
various resource allocations and protocol designs have been
proposed. For example, the works [11], [12] considered the
resource allocation problem for an information-energy hybrid
cellular network, where an FD BS broadcasts energy to power
users in the downlink, and at the same time each user transmits
information in the uplink in a TDD manner. Optimal time
and power allocations were derived in [11], [12]. In [13],
[14], a two-hop relay system with an FD energy harvesting
relay was studied. In particular, the work [13] proposed to
split the transmission into two stages for power transfer and
2information forwarding, and analyzed the rate performance of
FD relaying under different harvesting antenna settings and
transmission modes. In [14], the authors considered a different
relaying protocol to allow the relay to harvest energy and
forward information concurrently.
In this work, we consider exploiting full duplexity to
enhance PHY security and achieve SWIPT. Specifically, we
focus on FD two-way relay networks, where two legitimate
nodes simultaneously transmit and receive confidential infor-
mation through an FD multi-antenna relay, and an eaves-
dropper overhears the transmission from both the two legit-
imate nodes and the relay. Unlike the previous works on FD
two/multi-hop relay network [9], [16], [17], where the relay
operates under either FDT mode or FDJ mode, we consider
a more general relaying strategy—simultaneously relaying
information and sending jamming signal. In particular, an AN-
aided Alamouti-based rank-two beamforming strategy [18]
is employed to forward the confidential information. Our
goal is to jointly optimize the rank-two beamforming matrix
and the AN covariance matrix, such that the sum secrecy
rate of the two-way transmission is maximized. This sum
secrecy rate maximization (SSRM) problem is nonconvex
by nature, but can be converted into a form suitable for
minorization-maximization (MM) after applying the rank-two
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique. Thus, the classical
MM approach [19] can be invoked to iteratively compute a
stationary solution to the relaxed SSRM problem. Since the
stationary guarantee holds for the relaxed SSRM problem,
but not directly for the original SSRM problem, we further
develop a specific way to retrieve a stationary solution to the
latter from any stationary solution to the former. The key idea
is to exploit the rank-two beamforming structure to pin down
the SDR tightness. We should point out that the classical MM
approach requires solving each MM subproblem to optimality,
which could be computational demanding in practice. In light
of this drawback, we further propose an inexact MM approach
to the SSRM problem, under which an approximate solution
is sought at each iteration via an iteration-limited projected
gradient method. We prove that the proposed inexact MM
has the same stationary convergence guarantee as the classical
(exact) MM.
As an extension, we further consider the above two-way
FD relay secrecy design with a wireless energy-harvesting
eavesdropper. In particular, we assume that the eavesdropper
is also a system user who aims to harvest energy, but could
potentially eavesdrop the confidential information. In such a
case, the AN plays a dual role — on one hand, it jams
the eavesdropper to secure the two-way communication; on
the other hand, it also provides a source of energy for the
eavesdropper to harvest. Our goal here is again to maximize
the system’s sum secrecy rate with the energy harvesting
constraint on the eavesdropper. Following our SDR-based
MM approach, we show that a stationary solution to the
SSRM problem with energy harvesting can also be iteratively
computed via either exact or inexact MM updates.
Our main contributions are summarized below:
• We studied a joint Alamouti-based rank-two beamform-
ing and AN design for secrecy sum rate maximization
in a full-duplex two-way relay network, with direct links
between the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper. This
formulation was not considered in the prior literature.
• We developed an SDR-based MM approach for the afore-
mentioned design formulation. This proposed approach
guarantees convergence to a stationary solution, and the
proof technique, which connects SDR tightness and MM,
is new.
• Further, we proposed an inexact alternative to the SDR-
based MM approach for low-complexity implementation.
We showed that this inexact MM guarantees convergence
to a stationary solution.
• We considered a scenario extension where the eavesdrop-
per is also an energy-harvesting user.
A. Organization and Notations
This paper is organized as follows. The system model and
problem statement are given in Section II. Section III focuses
on the SSRM problem and develops an SDR-based MM
approach. Section IV proposes an inexact MM approach to
the SSRM problem. Extension to the energy-harvesting eaves-
dropper case is considered in Section V. Simulation results
comparing the proposed designs are illustrated in Section VI.
Section VII concludes the paper.
Our notations are as follows. (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H denote
transpose, conjugate and conjugate transpose, respectively; I
denotes an identity matrix with appropriate dimension; HN+
denotes the set of all N -by-N Hermitian positive semidef-
inite matrices; A  0 means that A is Hermitian positive
semidefinite, and A ≻ 0 means that A is Hermitian positive
definite; Diag(a, b) represents a diagonal matrix with diagonal
elements a and b; [·]+ is the projection onto the set of non-
negative numbers; CN (a,Σ) represents complex Gaussian
distribution with mean a and covariance matrix Σ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The scenario of interest is depicted in Fig. 1. Two legiti-
mate nodes, named Alice and Bob herein, perform two-way
communication with the aid of a relay. Alice, Bob and the
relay are equipped with full-duplex RF transceivers, and thus
they can simultaneously transmit and receive over the same RF
band. Alice has one antenna for transmission and one antenna
for reception, and the same applies to Bob. The relay has
N antennas for transmission and M antennas for reception.
The transmission is overheard by an evesdropper, named Eve,
who has one antenna. The problem is to design a transmission
scheme such that the two-way messages are both secured from
a PHY information security perspective.
A. Received Signal Model at Alice and Bob
Let us first describe the basic signal model. Alice and Bob
transmit coded confidential information signals sA(t) ∈ C and
sB(t) ∈ C to Bob and Alice, respectively (resp.). There is no
direct link between Alice and Bob, and the information signals
are forwarded by the relay. Let hi,R ∈ CM , i ∈ {A,B},
denote the channel from node i to the receive antennas of
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Fig. 1: System model.
the relay, where nodes A and B refer to Alice and Bob, resp.
Also, let HRR ∈ CM×N denote the channel from the transmit
antennas to the receive antennas of the relay, i.e., the so-called
self-interference (SI) channel. The relay’s received signal at
the tth time index is modeled as
yR(t) = hARsA(t) + hBRsB(t) +HRRxR(t) + nR(t),
t = 1, 2, . . .
(1)
where xR(t) ∈ CN is the transmit signal at the relay, which
aims at simultaneously forwarding the confidential information
signals to Bob and Alice; nR(t) ∼ CN (0, σ2RI) is additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The format that xR(t) takes
will be described soon. Note that the third term HRRxR(t) on
the right-hand side (RHS) of (1) is the full-duplex SI, which
has a much larger dynamic range than the signal components
hARsA(t) and hBRsB(t). However, the full-duplex SI can be
eliminated by applying nulling, where xR(t) is designed such
that HRRxR(t) = 0 [20]. We will take on this SI nulling
strategy1. Moreover, the received signals at Alice and Bob are
yi(t) =h
H
R,ixR(t) + hi,isi(t) + ni(t),
i ∈ {A,B}, t = 1, 2, . . . (2)
where, for i ∈ {A,B}, yi(t) is the received signal at node
i; hR,i ∈ CN is the channel from the relay to node i;
ni(t) ∼ CN (0, σ2i ) is AWGN. Again, the second term hi,isi(t)
on the RHS of (2) is full-duplex SI. Since Alice and Bob
have one receive antenna only, the aforementioned SI nulling
strategy is not applicable. However, since Alice (resp. Bob) has
knowledge of its own transmitted signal sA(t) (resp. sB(t)), it
can cancel the SI term hAAsA(t) (resp. hBBsB(t)) from (2).
Such signal cancellation is however imperfect owing to issues
such as the large dynamic range of the full-duplex SI; see [1]
for details. The SI-cancelled signal of yi(t) can be modeled
as
y¯i(t) = h
H
R,ixR(t) +
√
κihi,isi(t) + ni(t),
i ∈ {A,B}, t = 1, 2, . . .
where 0 < κi < 1 is the full-duplex SI residual factor of node
i [13].
1Implicitly, we have assumed N > M so that nulling can be done at
the relay’s transmission stage. On the other hand, for the case of N < M , a
similar nulling process can be performed at the relay’s reception stage; readers
are referred to our previous abridged conference paper [21] for the latter case.
The transmission format of xR(t) is specified as fol-
lows. We consider a combination of amplify-and-forward
(AF) beamforming, Alamouti space-time coding and artificial
noise (AN) strategies. As mentioned previously, we assume
SI nulling where the received signal in (1) is reduced to
yR(t) = hARsA(t) + hBRsB(t) + nR(t). The relay first
obtains soft estimates of sA(t) and sB(t) via the minimum
mean-square-error (MMSE) reception
sˆi(t) = f
H
i yR(t), i ∈ {A,B},
where fA = (σ2RI +
∑
i∈{A,B} pihiRh
H
iR)
−1hAR; fB =
(σ2RI +
∑
i∈{A,B} pihiRh
H
iR)
−1hBR; pi = E{|si(t)|2}, i ∈
{A,B}. Then, the estimates sˆA(t) and sˆB(t) are parsed into
blocks via sˆi(n) = [sˆi(2n − 1) sˆi(2n)]T , where i ∈ {A,B},
and n = 1, 2, . . . denotes the block index. Similarly, let
XR(n) = [xR(2n− 1) xR(2n)] denote the nth block of the
relay’s transmit signal. At every block n, the relay uses an
AF-beamformed Alamouti scheme to forward the estimated
information blocks sˆA(n) and sˆB(n). To be specific, we have
XR(n) =W0C (sˆA(n) + sˆB(n)) +Z(n), (3)
where W0 ∈ CN×2 is a transmit beamforming matrix;
C(s) =
[
s1 s
∗
2
s2 −s∗1
]
is the Alamouti space-time code; Z(n) = [z(2n−1) z(2n)] ∈
CN×2 is a superimposed AN for jamming Eve, in which z(t)
follows an i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution with mean
zero and covariance Q0 ∈ HN+ . To fulfill the SI nulling
condition HRRxR(n) = 0, W0 and Q0 are restricted to
satisfy HRRW0 = 0 and HRRQ0 = 0, resp. Let us examine
the corresponding received signals at Alice and Bob. By letting
y¯i(n) = [y¯i(2n − 1) y¯i(2n)], si(n) = [si(2n − 1) si(2n)],
i ∈ {A,B}, we have
y¯i(n) =h
H
R,iW0C (sˆB(n)) + h
H
R,iW0C (sˆA(n))
+ hHR,iZ(n) +
√
κihi,isi(n+ 1) + ni(n).
(4)
Suppose i = A. Then, the terms involving sA(2n − 1)
and sA(2n) in the above equation is the AF-induced self-
interference, and it can be eliminated by direct cancella-
tion [22]. Subsequently, by applying the standard Alamouti
reception [23] to the SI-cancelled version of y¯A(n), it can be
verified that the elements of sB(n) can be decoupled from
y¯A(n) with the same signal-to-interference-pluse-noise ratio
(SINR). Particularly, it can be shown from the above system
setup that the SINR of sB(n) at Alice is
SINRA(W0,Q0) =
p˜B‖hHRAW0‖2
σ˜2R‖hHRAW0‖2 + hHRAQ0hRA + σ˜2A
,
where p˜B , pB|(fA + fB)HhBR|2, σ˜2R , σ2R‖fA + fB‖2,
σ˜2A , σ
2
A+κApA|hAA|2. Also, the above argument applies to
i = B, and the SINR of sA(t) at Bob is
SINRB(W0,Q0) =
p˜A‖hHRBW0‖2
σ˜2R‖hHRBW0‖2 + hHRBQ0hRB + σ˜2B
,
where p˜A , pA|(fA+fB)HhAR|2, σ˜2B , σ2B+κBpB|hBB|2.
4B. Received Signal Model at Eve
Let us consider the received signal model at Eve under the
aforementioned system setup. Eve’s received signal is modeled
as
yE(t) = h
H
RExR(t) + hAEsA(t)+hBEsB(t) + nE(t),
t = 1, 2. . . .
(5)
where hRE ∈ CN is the channel from the relay to Eve; hi,E ∈
C, i ∈ {A,B}, is the channel from node i to Eve; nE(t) ∼
CN (0, σ2E) is noise. Note that in the above model, there are
direct links between the legitimate nodes and Eve. Denote
yE(n) = [yE(2n−1) yE(2n)]. Similar to (4), it can be shown
that
yE(n) =h
H
REW0C (sˆB(n)) + h
H
REW0C (sˆA(n))
+ hHREZ(n) +
∑
i∈{A,B} hi,Esi(n+ 1) + nE(n).
(6)
From the above formula, we observe that sA(n) and sB(n)
are present in both yE(n) and yE(n − 1). Let us assume
that Eve intends to decode sA(n) and sB(n) from yE(n)
and yE(n− 1), seeing other terms as interference and noise.
Then, through some tedious derivations which are shown in
Appendix A, Eve’s reception can be equivalently expressed as
an MIMO system
y˜E(t) =HE
[
sA(t)
sB(t)
]
+ n˜E(t) ∈ C2, t = 1, 2, . . . . (7)
Here,
HE =
[‖hHREW0‖f˜AR ‖hHREW0‖f˜BR
hAE hBE
]
is the equivalent MIMO channel, where f˜iR = (fA +
fB)
HhiR, i ∈ {A,B}; n˜E(t) is the interference-plus-noise
term with mean zero and covariance
Ψ =
[
Ψ11 0
0 Ψ22
]
∈ R2×2, (8)
where Ψ11 = σ˜2R‖hHREW0‖2 + hHREQ0hRE + σ2E +∑
i∈{A,B} pi|hiE |2 and Ψ22 = hHREQ0hRE + σ2E + (p˜A +
p˜B + σ˜
2
R)‖hHREW0‖2.
C. Sum Secrecy Rate Maximization Problem
Under the system setup in the last two subsections, the
problem is to design the AF beamforming matrix W0 and the
AN covarianceQ0 such that the sum secrecy rate of Alice and
Bob is maximized under a total transmission power constraint
at the relay. The secrecy achievable rate formulation is as
follows. The achievable rates at Alice and Bob are modeled
as
Ri(W0,Q0) = log (1 + SINRi(W0,Q0)) , i ∈ {A,B}, (9)
where we treat the full-duplex residual SI as Gaussian noise;
see [13], [20] for similar treatments. Also, by applying the
MIMO multiple-access channel capacity result to (7), the sum
achievable rate at Eve is formulated as
RE(W0,Q0) = log |I +HEPHHEΨ−1|, (10)
where P = Diag(pA, pB). The above achievable rate can be
reduced to
RE(W0,Q0)
= log
(
Ψ222 + θ1(Ψ22 + Ψ11) + θ2‖hHREW0‖2
Ψ11Ψ22
) (11)
where θ1 =
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|hiE |2, θ2 = (
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|f˜iR|2)θ1
−|∑i∈{A,B} f˜∗iRhiE |2; see Appendix B for details. From (11)
and (9), we characterize the sum secrecy rate as [24]2
Rs(W0,Q0) , RA(W0,Q0)+RB(W0,Q0)−RE(W0,Q0).
Moreover, from the system setup in the last subsection, it can
be verified that the total transmission power at the relay is
pR(W0,Q0) =
1
2
Tr(E{XR(n)XR(n)H})
=ζTr(W0W
H
0 ) + Tr(Q0),
where ζ = pA|(fA+ fB)HhAR|2+ pB|(fA+ fB)HhBR|2+
σ2R‖fA + fB‖2. The design problem is therefore formulated
as follows:
max
Q00, W0∈CN×2
Rs(W0,Q0) (12a)
s.t. pR(W0,Q0) ≤ PR, (12b)
HRRW0 = 0, HRRQ0 = 0, (12c)
where PR > 0 is the maximal transmission power threshold at
the relay, and recall that (12c) is for fulfilling the full-duplex SI
nulling condition. Problem (12) will be called the sum secrecy
rate maximization (SSRM) problem in the sequel.
III. AN SDR-BASED MM APPROACH TO THE SSRM
PROBLEM
The SSRM problem in (12) is nonconvex, and our aim is
to develop an SDR-based minorization-maximization (MM)
approach that will be shown to guarantee convergence to a
stationary solution to problem (12). In the first subsection, we
give a detailed description of our proposed approach, and in
the second subsection we show the convergence of the SDR-
based MM algorithm.
A. Description of the SDR-based MM Algorithm
Our development is as follows. First, we consider an alter-
native formulation of problem (12). Let r = rank(HRR) and
V0 ∈ CN×(N−r) be the right singular vectors associated with
the zero singular values of HRR. From (12c), it is easy to
verify that any feasible point (W0,Q0) of problem (12) can
be equivalently expressed as
W0 = V0W˜ , Q0 = V0QV
H
0 ,
for some W˜ ∈ C(N−r)×2 and Q ∈ Hn−r+ . By applying
the above equivalence to problem (12), and letting W˜ =
ζ−1/2W , we can rewrite problem (12) as
max
Q∈HN−r+ , W∈C
(N−r)×2
φ(WWH ,Q)
s.t. Tr(WWH) + Tr(Q) ≤ PR,
(13)
2The sum secrecy rate Rs implicitly assumes that Alice and Bob can
coordinately allocate their transmission rates. This can be made possible by
asking the relay to coordinate the rate allocation.
5f(WWH ,Q) =
∑2
i=1 log(ci + αi(WW
H ,Q)) + log(ψ1(WW
H ,Q)) + log(ψ2(WW
H ,Q)),
g1(WW
H ,Q) =
∑2
i=1 log(ci + βi(WW
H ,Q)),
g2(WW
H ,Q) = log
(
[ψ2(WW
H ,Q)]2 + θ1
[
ψ1(WW
H ,Q) + ψ2(WW
H ,Q)
]
+ ζ−1θ2Tr
(
WWHV H0 hREh
H
REV0
))
,
α1(WW
H ,Q) = β1(WW
H ,Q) + ζ−1p˜BTr(WW
HV H0 hRAh
H
RAV0),
α2(WW
H ,Q) = β2(WW
H ,Q) + ζ−1p˜ATr(WW
HV H0 hRBh
H
RBV0),
β1(WW
H ,Q) = ζ−1σ˜2RTr(WW
HV H0 hRAh
H
RAV0) + Tr(QV
H
0 hRAh
H
RAV0),
β2(WW
H ,Q) = ζ−1σ˜2RTr(WW
HV H0 hRBh
H
RBV0) + Tr(QV
H
0 hRBh
H
RBV0),
ψ1(WW
H ,Q) = σ˜2Rζ
−1Tr(WWHV H0 hREh
H
REV0) + Tr(QV
H
0 hREh
H
REV0) + σ
2
E +
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|hiE |2,
ψ2(WW
H ,Q) = Tr(QV H0 hREh
H
REV0) + σ
2
E +Tr(WW
HV H0 hREh
H
REV0),
c1 = σ˜
2
A, c2 = σ˜
2
B , ζ = pA|(fA + fB)HhAR|2 + pB|(fA + fB)HhBR|2 + σ2R‖fA + fB‖2. (14)
where φ(WWH ,Q) , f(WWH ,Q) − g1(WWH ,Q) −
g2(WW
H ,Q), and f , g1 and g2 are defined in (14) on the
top of the next page. Also, it is immediate that the solutions of
problems (12) and (13) are related through W0 = ζ1/2V0W
and Q0 = V0QV H0 .
Second, we apply semidefinite relaxation (SDR) [25] to
problem (13). Specifically, by noticing the following equiv-
alence
W =WWH ⇐⇒W  0, rank(W) ≤ 2,
we replace WWH in problem (13) with W and drop the
nonconvex rank-two constraint on W to get an SDR of
problem (13) as follows:
max
W0,Q0
φ(W ,Q) , f(W,Q)− g1(W ,Q)− g2(W ,Q)
(15a)
s.t. Tr(W) + Tr(Q) ≤ PR. (15b)
Notice that f(W ,Q) and g1(W ,Q) are both concave with
respect to (w.r.t.) (W ,Q), whereas g2(W ,Q) is neither
convex nor concave w.r.t. (W ,Q). Hence, problem (15) is still
a nonconvex optimization problem. In the sequel, we develop
an MM approach to (15) by finding a tight concave lower
bound on φ(W ,Q).
First of all, given any feasible point (Wˆ , Qˆ) of (15), an
upper bound on g1(W ,Q) can be easily obtained from the
first-order condition, or linearization of g1 at (Wˆ , Qˆ), i.e.,
g1(W ,Q) ≤ g˜1(W ,Q;Wˆ , Qˆ),
where g˜1(W ,Q;Wˆ , Qˆ) , g1(Wˆ , Qˆ) +
Tr(∇Wg1(Wˆ , Qˆ)H(W − Wˆ)) + Tr(∇Qg1(Wˆ , Qˆ)H(Q −
Qˆ)). For g2(W ,Q), we make use of the inequality
log(x) ≤ log(xˆ) + x−xˆxˆ to obtain
g2(W ,Q) ≤ g˜2(W ,Q;Wˆ , Qˆ),
where
g˜2(W ,Q;Wˆ, Qˆ) , g2(Wˆ , Qˆ)− 1+
(ψ2)
2 + θ1(ψ1 + ψ2) + θ2ζ
−1hHREV0WV
H
0 hRE
(ψˆ2)2 + θ1(ψˆ1 + ψˆ2) + θ2ζ−1hHREV0WˆV
H
0 hRE
,
and for notational simplicity we have dropped the arguments
of ψi and used ψˆi to represent ψi(Wˆ , Qˆ).
Now, the proposed MM algorithm recursively solves the
following optimization problem
(Wk+1,Qk+1) ∈ argmax
W0,Q0
φ˜(W ,Q;Wk,Qk) (16a)
s.t. Tr(W) + Tr(Q) ≤ PR, (16b)
until some stopping rule is met. In (16), we have defined
φ˜(W ,Q;Wk,Qk) , f(W ,Q) − g˜1(W ,Q;Wk,Qk) −
g˜2(W ,Q;W
k,Qk) for k = 0, 1, . . . and some feasible
starting point (W0,Q0).
Problem (16) is a convex problem, which can be optimally
solved, e.g., by CVX [26]. Moreover, by direct application of
the MM convergence result [27, Theorem 1], we conclude that
every limit point of {(Wk,Qk)}k is a stationary solution to
problem (15).
The MM approach proposed above is, at first look, an MM
approach to the relaxed SSRM problem in (15), rather than the
original SSRM problem. Thus, it is important to understand
whether problem (15) can provide a tight relaxation to the
original SSRM problem (13), and whether we can obtain a
stationary solution to the original SSRM problem from the
proposed MM iteration. We address these issues in the next
subsection.
B. SDR Tightness and Stationary Convergence
In this subsection, we establish the SDR tightness and
the stationary convergence of the MM iteration. Since prob-
lem (16) has a compact feasible set, the iterate {(Wk,Qk)}k
generated by the MM iteration in (16) has at least one
limit point. Suppose that (W¯ , Q¯) is any limit point of
{(Wk,Qk)}k. Consider the following two problems:
max
W0,Q0
φ˜(W ,Q;W¯ , Q¯)
s.t. Tr(W) + Tr(Q) ≤ PR,
(17)
6and
min
W0,Q0
Tr(W) + Tr(Q) (18a)
s.t. αi(W ,Q) = αi(W¯ , Q¯), i = 1, 2, (18b)
βi(W ,Q) = βi(W¯ , Q¯), i = 1, 2, (18c)
ψi(W ,Q) = ψi(W¯ , Q¯), i = 1, 2, (18d)
Tr
(
WV H0 hREh
H
REV0
)
= Tr
(
W¯V H0 hREh
H
REV0
)
, (18e)
where αi, βi and φ˜ are defined in (14) and (16a), resp.
Problems (17) and (18) are closely related, as revealed by
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let (W⋆,Q⋆) be any optimal solution to prob-
lem (18). Then, (W⋆,Q⋆) is also an optimal solution to
problem (17).
The proof of Lemma 1 is relegated to Appendix C. Using
Lemma 1, we establish the following main result:
Theorem 1 There exists an optimal solution (W⋆,Q⋆) to
problem (17) such that rank(W⋆) ≤ 2; i.e., W⋆ can be de-
composed as W ⋆W ⋆H for some W ⋆ ∈ C(N−r)×2. Moreover,
(W ⋆,Q⋆) is a stationary solution or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) solution to problem (13).
The proof of Theorem 1 is shown in Appendix D. The idea
behind the proof is to use the semidefinite program (SDP)
rank-reduction result [28] to show the existence of a rank-
two optimal W⋆ for problem (17). Theorem 1 not only
pins down the SDR tightness, it also gives a procedure of
recovering a stationary solution to the SSRM problem (13).
Specifically, after the convergence of the MM iteration, if W¯
has rank no greater than two, we can simply obtain a stationary
solution to problem (13) by applying square-root (and rank-
two) decomposition to W¯ ; otherwise, we form the problem
in (18) and apply the rank-reduction procedure to obtain a
rank-two beamforming solution to problem (13) with station-
arity guarantee. We should mention that the rank-reduction
procedure can be efficiently performed (with polynomial-time
complexity); readers are referred to [28] for details.
To summarize, we have developed an MM approach for
computing a stationary solution to the SSRM problem (13)
iteratively. However, as one may have noticed, each MM iter-
ation in (16) requires solving a convex optimization problem
to optimality, which could be computationally demanding. In
view of this drawback, in the next section we will propose a
low-complexity MM alternative via inexact MM updates.
IV. AN INEXACT MM APPROACH TO THE SSRM
PROBLEM (12)
In this section, we present an inexact MM algorithm for
the SSRM problem. In addition to computational efficiency,
the inexact MM algorithm to be presented is guaranteed to
converge to a stationary solution to the SSRM problem.
A. A General Inexact MM Framework
Let us first introduce the notion of gradient mapping [29],
which will be useful for characterizing the solution inexactness
and stationarity of the method to be considered. Consider an
optimization problem
max
x
ϕ(x)
s.t. x ∈ C.
(19)
where the objective function ϕ(x) is continuously differen-
tiable (not necessarily convex), and the feasible set C is convex
and compact. The gradient mapping of ϕ(x) at x¯ ∈ C is
defined as
∇˜ϕ(x¯) , P (x¯+∇ϕ(x¯))− x¯, (20)
where P(x) represents the projection of x on C. The following
result characterizes the relationship between gradient mapping
and stationarity:
Lemma 2 ([30]) A point x¯ ∈ C is a stationary solution to
problem (19) if and only if ∇˜ϕ(x¯) = 0.
Now, let us turn back to the MM subproblem (16), which is
restated below: max
x
φ˜(x;xk)
s.t. x ∈ D,
(21)
where, for notational convenience, we denote x , (W ,Q)
and D , {(W ,Q) | Tr(W +Q) ≤ PR, W  0, Q  0}.
Instead of solving problem (21) exactly, we perform an update
via the following rule:
Find a point xk+1 ∈ D such that
φ˜(xk+1;xk)− φ˜(xk;xk) ≥ ζk‖∇˜φ˜(xk;xk)‖2, (22)
where ζk > 0 is an iteration-dependent constant and is
bounded away from zero.
We call (22) an inexact updating rule; the reason is that the
exact MM update (or the optimal solution to problem (21))
satisfies (22), but the converse is not true. We will specify
in the next subsection how we build an efficient update that
satisfies (22). For now, let us focus on the guarantee of
convergence to a stationary solution. We have the following
result:
Proposition 1 Suppose that {xk} is a sequence generated by
an inexact updating rule in (22). Then, every limit point of
{xk} is a stationary solution to problem (15).
The key of the proof of Proposition 1 is that the updating
rule (22) ensures sufficient improvement between the con-
secutive iterations if the current point is not stationary. By
accumulating these improvements, the inexact MM iteration
will finally reside at a stationary solution. The detailed proof
is given in Appendix E. In light of Proposition 1, a result
similar to Theorem 1 is established as follows.
Theorem 2 Let xˆ = (Wˆ , Qˆ) be any limit point generated by
an inexact MM rule in (22), and consider the problems (17)
7and (18) with (W¯ , Q¯) replaced by (Wˆ , Qˆ). Then, it holds true
that there exists an optimal solution (W⋆,Q⋆) to problem (17)
such that W⋆ = W ⋆W ⋆H for some W ⋆ ∈ C(N−r)×2,
and that (W ⋆,Q⋆) is a stationary solution to the SSRM
problem (13).
The proof of Theorem 2 is identical to that of Theorem 1 and
thus is omitted.
The inexact MM updating rule in (22) provides a general
sufficient condition under which an algorithm can guarantee
convergence to a stationary solution. The next question is how
we can achieve (22) in a computationally efficient manner.
This will be addressed in the next subsection.
B. A Projected Gradient-based Inexact MM Implementation
Let us consider the following: generate an inexact solution
xk+1 to problem (21) via an iteration-limited projected gradi-
ent method (PGM). As we will see shortly, such a PGM has
strong connection to the aforementioned inexact MM updating
rule. The inexact PGM for problem (21) is summarized as
follows:
Algorithm 1 An Inexact PGM for Problem (21)
1: Set l = 0, xk,0 = xk and the maximum number of PG
operations Lk ≥ 1
2: while l ≤ Lk − 1 do
3: Set xk,l+1 = xk,l + αk,l∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk), where αk,l >
0 is the stepsize determined by either Armijo’s rule or
(limited) minimization rule [30].
4: l = l + 1;
5: end while
6: xk+1 = xk,Lk .
In Algorithm 1, the parameter Lk represents the maxi-
mum number of PG operations at the kth MM iteration.
We see that when Lk = 1 for all k, Algorithm 1 reduces
to directly applying the projected gradient ascent method to
the original relaxed SSRM problem (15). When Lk > 1,
Algorithm 1 has an incentive to make more progress at each
MM subproblem by performing multiple PG operations. Also,
when every Lk approaches infinity, Algorithm 1 becomes the
exact MM update, and thus the resulting MM iteration is
guaranteed to converge to a stationary solution to problem (13)
by Theorem 1. The following proposition reveals that the
aforementioned convergence guarantee holds for any finite Lk:
Proposition 2 Suppose that {xk} is a sequence generated by
Algorithm 1. Then, every limit point of {xk} is a stationary
solution to problem (15). Moreover, by using the same con-
struction [i.e., problems (17) and (18)] as that in Theorem 1,
a stationary solution to problem (13) can be extracted from
every limit point of {xk}.
The key of the proof is to show that the iterations generated
by Algorithm 1 fulfill the inequality (22). Consequently, the
result follows directly from Proposition 1 and Theorem 2. The
detailed proof is relegated to Appendix F.
Thus far, we have only considered convergence guarantees
arising from Algorithm 1. The remaining issue is whether
Algorithm 1 can be efficiently implemented. Clearly, the main
computation lies in performing the PG operations, particularly,
the computation of ∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk) (cf. line 3 of Algorithm 1).
From the definition of gradient mapping [cf. (20)], one needs
to find an efficient way to calculate P(xk,l +∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)),
i.e., solving the following projection problem:
min
W0,Q0
∥∥∥∥
[
W
Q
]
−
[
W
k,l +∇W φ˜(xk,l;xk)
Qk,l +∇Qφ˜(xk,l;xk)
]∥∥∥∥
2
s.t. Tr(W +Q) ≤ PR, W  0, Q  0.
(23)
Fortunately, problem (23) admits a water-filling-like solu-
tion [31, Fact 1]:
W
⋆ = F1Diag(η
⋆
1)F
H
1 , Q
⋆ = F2Diag(η
⋆
2)F
H
2 , (24)
where F1Diag(η˜1)FH1 and F2Diag(η˜2)FH2 are the eigen-
value decompositions of Wk,l +∇W φ˜(xk,l;xk) and Qk,l +
∇Qφ˜(xk,l;xk), resp., and
η⋆1 = [η˜1 − ν⋆1]+, η⋆2 = [η˜2 − ν⋆1]+,
with ν⋆ ≥ 0 being the water-filling level. The value of ν⋆
relates to the total power PR and can be efficiently determined.
Readers are referred to [31, Fact 1] for the details of solving
the projection problem (23).
C. Complexity Comparison with Exact MM
Let us analyze the computational complexities of the exact
MM and the inexact MM with iteration-limited PG. While
the MM subproblem (16) is convex, it is not in a standard
SDP form, owing to the logarithm function f . To solve
problem (16), a successive approximation method embedded
with a primal-dual interior-point method (IPM) is employed,
say by CVX. As is known, the arithmetic complexity for
the generic primal-dual IPM to solve a standard SDP is
O(max{m,n}4n1/2 log(1/ε)) [25], where m, n and ε rep-
resent the number of linear constraints, the dimension of
the PSD cone and the solution accuracy, resp. Therefore,
for the MM subproblem (16), the per-iteration complexity is
O(LSA(N − r)4.5 log(1/ε)), where LSA denotes the number
of successive approximations used. On the other hand, for the
PG-based inexact MM algorithm, its computation is mainly
dominated by the projection operation, which involves the
eigendecomposition of complexityO((N−r)3) and the water-
filling level computation of complexity O(N − r). Therefore,
the per-iteration complexity of PG-based inexact MM algo-
rithm is O(LPG(N−r)3), where LPG denotes the number of
PG operations used for each MM subproblem. By comparing
the above two complexity results, we see that the inexact MM
generally has lower complexity than the exact MM, because
LPG is typically O(1), which is much smaller than LSA.
V. EXTENSION: SUM SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
UNDER AN ENERGY-HARVESTING EVE
In this section, we consider an extended scenario where the
system setup and the secrecy rate model are the same as in
8Sec. II, with the addition that Eve is also an energy harvesting
user of the system. Thus, the relay is also required to provide
certain wireless power transfer to Eve.
Under the signal model in Sec. II, the wireless power
transfer from the source and the relay to Eve can be formulated
as
pE(W0,Q0)
=τ
(1
2
hHREE{XR(n)XR(n)H}hRE +
∑
i∈{A,B}
pi|hiE |2
)
=τ
(
hHRE(ζW0W
H
0 +Q0)hRE +
∑
i∈{A,B}
pi|hiE |2
)
,
where 0 < τ ≤ 1 denotes the wireless power transfer
efficiency; see [15]. The subsequent SSRM problem with
energy harvesting, coined SSRM-EH for short, is as follows:
max
Q00, W0∈CN×2
Rs(W0,Q0) (25a)
s.t. pR(W0,Q0) ≤ PR, (25b)
pE(W0,Q0) ≥ ǫ, (25c)
HRRW0 = 0, HRRQ0 = 0, (25d)
where ǫ > 0 is the minimal power transfer requirement at
Eve. Similar to problem (13), the SSRM-EH problem can be
equivalently written as
max
Q0, W∈C(N−r)×2
φ(WWH ,Q) (26a)
s.t. Tr(WWH) + Tr(Q) ≤ PR, (26b)
τhHREV0(WW
H +Q)V H0 hRE ≥ ǫ˜, (26c)
where ǫ˜ = ǫ − τ∑i∈{A,B} pi|hiE |2. Again, the SDR-based
MM approach developed in Sec. III can be employed to
handle the SSRM-EH problem (26). In particular, the corre-
sponding MM subproblem is given by
(Wk+1,Qk+1)
∈ argmax
W0,Q0
φ˜(W ,Q;Wk,Qk)
s.t. Tr(W) + Tr(Q) ≤ PR,
τhHREV0(W +Q)V
H
0 hRE ≥ ǫ˜,
(27)
where φ˜ is defined in (16a).
Let (W¯ , Q¯) be any limit point of the MM iteration in (27).
Then, a stationary solution to the SSRM-EH problem (26) can
be retrieved from any optimal solution to the following SDP
problem:
min
W0,Q0
Tr(W) + Tr(Q) (28a)
s.t. (18b)− (18e) satisfied, (28b)
τhHREV0(W +Q)V
H
0 hRE ≥ ǫ˜, (28c)
Specifically, we have a similar result as Theorem 1:
Theorem 3 There exists an optimal solution (W⋆,Q⋆) to
problem (28) such that rank(W⋆) ≤ 2; i.e., W⋆ can be
decomposed as W ⋆W ⋆H for some W ⋆ ∈ C(N−r)×2. Also,
(W ⋆,Q⋆) is a stationary solution or KKT solution to prob-
lem (26).
Proof. See Appendix G. 
In addition, the inexact MM update in Algorithm 1 can also
be applied to the SSRM-EH problem (26) with the gradient
projection step modified as
min
W0,Q0
θ(W ,Q) ,
∥∥∥∥
[
W
Q
]
−
[
W
k,l +∇W φ˜(xk,l;xk)
Qk,l +∇Qφ˜(xk,l;xk)
]∥∥∥∥
2
(29a)
s.t. Tr(W +Q) ≤ PR, (29b)
τhHREV0(W +Q)V
H
0 hRE ≥ ǫ˜. (29c)
By invoking the solution in (24), problem (29) can be effi-
ciently solved using the dual ascent method [30]. In particular,
let λ ≥ 0 be the dual variable associated with (29c). The dual
of problem (29) is given by
max
λ≥0
d(λ),
where
d(λ) ,
min
W,Q
θ(W ,Q)− λ(τTr((W +Q)V H0 hREhHREV0)− ǫ˜)
s.t. Tr(W +Q) ≤ PR, W  0, Q  0.
(30)
Given λ, problem (30) can be written into a form like
problem (23), and thus has a solution like (24). Moreover,
the optimal dual variable can be computed by using bisection
to search for a λ⋆ ≥ 0 such that the complementarity condition
for the constraint (29c) is satisfied.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate
the performances of the proposed SSRM algorithms.
A. The Case of No Energy Harvesting with Eve
We consider the scenario in Sec. II and the SSRM approach
in Secs. III–IV. The results to be presented in this subsection
are based on the following simulation settings, unless other-
wise specified: The number of transmit antennas and receive
antennas at the relay are N = 6 and M = 3, resp.; all
the channels are randomly generated following i.i.d. complex
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance; the
receive noise at each node has the same unit variance, i.e.,
σ2A = σ
2
B = σ
2
E = σ
2
R = 1; both Alice and Bob have the
same full-duplex SI residual factor κA = κB = κ and the
same transmit power pA = pB .
1) Exact and Inexact MM Comparisons: Fig. 2 shows the
convergence behaviors of the exact MM and the inexact MM
(In-MM) algorithms under one problem instance. Specifically,
the exact MM solves the problem (16) exactly with CVX [26]
(thus named “MM-CVX”). The inexact MM approximately
solves the problem (16) by Algorithm 1, with Lk = L
for all k and with the stepsize αk,l determined by Armijo’s
rule. Both the exact and inexact MMs are initialized by
W
0 = Q0 = PR2(N−r)I. The stopping criterion for MM-CVX
is |φ˜(xk¯;xk¯−1) − φ˜(xk¯−1;xk¯−2)|/|φ˜(xk¯−1;xk¯−2)| < 10−3
for some k¯, and the stopping criterion for In-MM is that the
9In-MM iterate attains the same objective value φ˜(xk¯;xk¯−1) as
the MM-CVX after convergence. In Fig. 2, we also considered
In-MMs with different number of PG operations L, including
fixed L = 1, 3, 5 and variable L which is randomly and
uniformly chosen from 1 to 5 at each MM iteration. As seen,
the sum secrecy rates of both the exact and inexact MMs
increase with the number of iterations, and converge to about
2 nats/s/Hz. The exact MM converges in 4 iterations, which
is very fast. Also, the inexact MMs need more iterations to
converge, varying from 7 iterations (w.r.t. L = 5) to 90
iterations (w.r.t. L = 1), which is expected.
Since the per-iteration complexities of the exact MM and
inexact MM are different, a fairer comparison is to measure
their running times. Fig. 3 plots the running times of In-MMs
(normalized by the time of MM-CVX at convergence) when
In-MMs achieve αφ˜(xk¯;xk¯−1) for α = 0.1 ∼ 1 under the
same setting as Fig. 2. It is clear that In-MMs run much faster
than MM-CVX. Moreover, In-MM with variable L is seen to
be more efficient than that with fixed L. The reason for this
is as follows: The inexact MM algorithm involves two loops,
namely, the outer MM iterations and the inner iteration-limited
PG operations. Therefore, the total computational complexity
equals the complexity of the inner PG operations times the
total number of outer MM iterations. From Fig. 2, we see that
the more PG operations performed for the inner loop, the less
MM iterations for the outer, and vice versa. Therefore, there
is a trade off between the solution inexactness and the number
of outer MM iterations. From Fig. 3, it seems that choosing
L uniformly and randomly may get a better balance of these
two.
2) Secrecy Rates Versus the Source Power: We study the
relationship between the source power and the sum secrecy
rate performance under different SI residual level κ. For
comparison, we also considered the half-duplex two-way relay
designs, where Alice, Bob and the relay are all half duplex.
In such a case, there is no SI at the each node, but the
rate suffers from a reduction by a half. One can check that
the SDR-based MM approach developed in this paper is still
applicable by setting κA = κB = 0, removing the zero-forcing
constraint (12c), lifting the variable dimension of W and Q
from (N−r)×(N−r) to N×N and modifying Eve’s sum rate
accordingly.3 Fig. 4 shows the result, where “FD” and “HD”
correspond to the full-duplex and half duplex-based designs,
resp. From these figures, we have the following observations.
Firstly, we observe that the sum secrecy rate of FD is generally
better than that of HD. The reason for this is two-fold: 1)
The HD protocol suffers from half rate reduction; 2) The
existence of the direct links makes the HD more vulnerable
3Under the half-duplex case, the received signal models at Alice, Bob and
Eve are the same as before, except for the noise covariance in (7), which is
changed as
Ψ =
[
σ˜2
R
‖hH
RE
W0‖2 + hHREQ0hRE + σ
2
E
σ2
E
]
.
Hence, the Eve’s sum rate is calculated accordingly as
RE(W0,Q0) = log
((
σ2
E
σ˜2
R
+ θ1σ˜2R + σ
2
E
∑
i∈{A,B} p˜i +
θ2
)
‖hHREW0‖
2 + (θ1 + σ2E)h
H
REQ0hRE + σ
4
E + σ
2
Eθ1
)
−
log
(
σ2
E
σ˜2
R
‖hH
RE
W0‖2 + σ2Eh
H
RE
Q0hRE + σ
4
E
)
.
to interception than the FD, as the direct links of the former
are free of interference, whereas for the FD case, they are
interfered by the relay-to-Eve link, which somehow can better
protect the sources’ transmissions. Second, the sum secrecy
rates of FD and HD both first increase with the source power,
and then decrease when the source power is higher than a
certain level. For the FD case, this is because the residual
SI increases with the source power and can compensate any
SINR gains obtained from transmit optimization; while for the
HD case, this behavior is owing to the improved interception
quality from the direct links.
3) Secrecy Rates Versus the Number of Relay’s Transmit
Antenna: In this example, we study the relationship between
the sum secrecy rate and the number of transmit antennas
N at the relay. The result is shown in Fig. 5. As seen, for
N ≤ 3 FD cannot provide positive secrecy rate, owing to the
ZF constraints (recall the number of receive antennas at relay
is 3). However, when N increases, the effect of ZF constraint
becomes less, and the benefit of exploiting FD (or the temporal
degrees of freedom (TDoF) with STR) outweighs the loss of
the spatial DoF (SDoF).
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B. The Energy-Harvesting Eve Case
We consider the energy-harvesting Eve extension in Sec. V.
The simulation settings are basically the same as before, i.e.,
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N = 6, M = 3, pA = pB , κA = κB = κ, but with the
following modifications, which are adopted to better capture
the power transfer scenario: The noise variance at each node
is the same and equals −50dBm. All the channels follow
complex Gaussian distribution with mean zero. The variance
of Eve’s channel is set to −10dB, and that of all the others’
channels to −20dB; i.e., Eve is on average closer to the relay
in order to better receive energy. The power transfer efficiency
is τ = 10%.
1) Secrecy Rates Versus the Power Transfer Threshold:
Let us first study the achievable rate-power region of the
proposed design for different residual SI factor κ. The result
is shown in Fig. 6. For comparison, we also plotted the result
of the HD design. From the figure, we see that the rate-power
region shrinks when the residual SI level increases. Moreover,
compared with the HD design, the FD design is able to attain
larger secrecy rate when SI is well suppressed, but its maximal
power transfer ability is inferior to the HD design. This is
because the FD design sacrifices the SDoF in order to better
exploit the TDoF. However, for the power transfer constraint
in (26c), such SDoF loss would have impact on the maximal
power transfer ability, as can be seen from
τhHREV0(W+Q)V
H
0 hRE ≤ τPR‖V H0 hRE‖2 < τPR‖hRE‖2
where the first inequality is due to the total power constraint
at the relay, and the last inequality follows from the fact that
V0 is a semi-unitary matrix.
2) The Importance of Artificial Noise: In this example, we
examine when AN is crucial for the design. To this end, we
consider the same setting as Fig. 6 and measure the ratio of
AN’s power to the total transmit power at the relay under
different power transfer requirement ǫ. The result is shown in
Fig. 7. From the figure, we see that for both FD and HD, the
percentages of AN’s power first increase and then decrease,
when Eve’s power transfer requirement increases. This phe-
nomenon reveals an interesting result — For extremely loose
or stringent power requirements, AN is not crucial. However,
for moderate operational regions, AN is important. This may
be explained as follows: For very small ǫ, a small portion of
AN already fulfills Eve’s power transfer requirement, and there
is no need to further waste power on AN. With the increase of
power transfer requirement, more power needs to be allocated
to Eve, and it is reasonable to use AN to fulfill this need since
it also jams Eve’s reception. However, when the power transfer
requirement becomes extremely stringent, the relay has to
align the transmit signal around Eve (to make problem (25)
feasible), which in turn may result in low reception power at
the legitimate nodes. In other words, to Alice and Bob, the
relay virtually works in a low transmission power regime. For
such a power limited regime, more power should be allocated
to information symbols to achieve higher secrecy rate.
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Fig. 6: Power transfer level vs. sum secrecy rate (pA = pB =
PR = 10dBm).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered the sum secrecy rate
maximization (SSRM)-based transmit optimization for full-
duplex two-way relaying communications. A minorization-
maximization (MM) approach was proposed for the SSRM
problem. We prove that convergence to a stationary solution to
the SSRM problem is guaranteed with either exact or inexact
MM updates, as long as certain solution inexactness condition
is satisfied throughout the iterations. Extension to the case of
energy-harvesting Eve was also considered.
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APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Eve’s Reception Model
Let us focus on the reception of sA(2n−1) and sB(2n−1)
from yE(n) and yE(n−1). For yE(n), we apply the standard
Alamouti reception to retrieve a sample, denoted herein by
y˜E,1(n), that corresponds to the reception of sA(2n− 1) and
sB(2n − 1). Following the model of yE(n) in (6), one can
show the expression of y˜E,1(n) in (31), where [hHREW0]ℓ
denotes the ℓth element of hHREW0. For yE(n− 1), observe
from (6) that sA(2n− 1) and sB(2n− 1) appears only in the
first element of yE(n−1). By letting y˜E,2(n) = [yE(n−1)]1,
and following (6), the expression of y˜E,2(n) can be obtained
and it is shown in (32). By stacking the two samples as
y˜E(n) = [y˜E,1(n) y˜E,2(n)]
T
, it can be shown from (31)–(32)
that
y˜(n) =HE
[
sA(2n− 1)
sB(2n− 1)
]
+ n˜E(n),
where HE and n˜E(n) are defined in (7).
Also, the reception of sA(2n) and sB(2n) from yE(n) and
yE(n − 1) follows the same derivations as above. Thus, we
conclude that (7) provides an equivalent MIMO model for
Eve’s reception.
B. Derivation of Eve’s Sum Achievable Rate
The sum achievable rate (10) at Eve can be further derived
as (33), where θ1 and θ2 are defined in (11). To express
RE(W0,Q0) as (11), notice from the definitions of Ψ11
and Ψ22 in (8) that Ψ11 = Ψ22 − ‖hHREW0‖2(p˜A + p˜B) +∑
i∈{A,B} pi|hiE |2. Hence,
Ψ11Ψ22
=Ψ222 − ‖hHREW0‖2(p˜A + p˜B)Ψ22 +
∑
i∈{A,B}
pi|hiE |2Ψ22
=Ψ222 − ‖hHREW0‖2(
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|f˜iR|2)Ψ22 + θ1Ψ22,
(34)
where the second equality is due to p˜i = pi|f˜iR|2 (cf. the
definitions of p˜i and f˜iR for i ∈ {A,B}). Now, by substituting
(34) into (33), we obtain
RE(W0,Q0)
= log
(
Ψ222 + θ1(Ψ22 +Ψ11) + θ2‖hHREW0‖2
Ψ11Ψ22
)
.
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Since g˜1(W ,Q;Wk,Qk) and g˜2(W ,Q;Wk,Qk) are
convex upper bounds of g1(W ,Q) and g2(W ,Q), resp.,
which is tight at (Wk,Qk), it follows from the basic MM
property that
φ(Wk,Qk) = φ˜(Wk,Qk;Wk,Qk)
≤ φ˜(Wk+1,Qk+1;Wk,Qk)
≤ φ(Wk+1,Qk+1)
.
.
.
≤ φ(W¯ , Q¯),
i.e., {φ˜(Wk+1,Qk+1;Wk,Qk)}k converges monotonically
to the upper bound φ(W¯ , Q¯). By noting the continuity of
the function φ˜, and taking a convergent subsequence of
{(Wk,Qk)}k with a limit point (W¯ , Q¯), we have
φ˜(W ,Q;W¯ , Q¯) ≤ φ(W¯ , Q¯)
for all feasible (W ,Q). In addition, from the definition of φ˜,
we have φ˜(W¯ , Q¯;W¯ , Q¯) = φ(W¯ , Q¯). Thus, (W¯ , Q¯) is an
optimal solution to problem (17).
On the other hand from the construction of problem (18),
one can easily show that every optimal (W⋆,Q⋆) of (18)
must be feasible for problem (17) with φ˜(W⋆,Q⋆;W¯ , Q¯) =
φ˜(W¯ , Q¯;W¯ , Q¯). Hence, every optimal (W⋆,Q⋆) of (18) is
optimal for (17).
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Notice that problem (18) is an SDP with 7 constraints. By
the SDP rank-reduction result in [28, Lemma 3.1], there exists
an optimal solution (W⋆,Q⋆) to problem (18) such that
rank(W⋆)2 + rank(Q⋆)2 ≤ 7,
which implies that
rank(W⋆) ≤
√
7 < 3
Hence, rank(W⋆) equals 1 or 2, and by Lemma 1 such an
optimal (W⋆,Q⋆) is also optimal for problem (17). Next, we
establish the second part of the Theorem.
Since (W⋆,Q⋆) is an optimal solution to problem (17),
it satisfies the KKT conditions of problem (17). To describe
it, let us denote γ ≥ 0, Y  0 and Z  0 as the dual
variables associated with the power constraint, W⋆  0 and
Q⋆  0 of problem (17). Then, the KKT conditions of
problem (17) are shown in (35), where for notational simplicity
we have dropped all the arguments and used (·)⋆ [resp. (¯·)] to
represent the function value or gradient evaluation at the point
(W⋆,Q⋆) [resp. (W¯ , Q¯)].
Since β⋆i = β¯i and ψ⋆i = ψ¯i for all i [cf. problem (18)], and
∇W β¯i, ∇Qβ¯i are constant matrices, irrespective of (W ,Q),
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y˜E,1(n) = ‖hHREW0‖

 ∑
i∈{A,B}
(fA + fB)
HhiRsi(2n− 1) + (fA + fB)HnR(2n− 1)

+
1
‖hHREW0‖

[hHREW0]1
(
hHREz(2n− 1) + nE(2n+ 1) +
∑
i∈{A,B}
hiEsi(2n+ 1)
)
−
[hHREW0]
∗
2
(
hTREz
∗(2n) + n∗E(2n+ 2) +
∑
i∈{A,B}
h∗iEs
∗
i (2n+ 2)
)

(31)
y˜E,2(n) =
∑
i∈{A,B}
hiEsi(2n− 1) + hHREz(2n− 3) + nE(2n− 1)+
[hHREW0]1

 ∑
i∈{A,B}
(fA + fB)
HhiRsi(2n− 3) + (fA + fB)HnR(2n− 3)

+
[hHREW0]
∗
2

 ∑
i∈{A,B}
(fA + fB)
HhiRsi(2n− 2) + (fA + fB)HnR(2n− 2)


(32)
RE(W0,Q0)
= log |I +HEPHHEΨ−1|
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣1 +
‖hHREW0‖
2(
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|f˜iR|
2)
Ψ11
‖hHREW0‖
∑
i∈{A,B} f˜iRh
∗
iE
Ψ22
‖hHREW0‖
∑
i∈{A,B} f˜
∗
iRhiE
Ψ11
1 +
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|hiE |
2
Ψ22
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
(
Ψ11Ψ22 + ‖hHREW0‖2(
∑
i∈{A,B} pi|f˜iR|2)Ψ22 + θ1Ψ11 + θ2‖hHREW0‖2
Ψ11Ψ22
)
(33)
2∑
i=1
∇Wα⋆i
ci + α⋆i
+
2∑
i=1
∇Wψ⋆i
ψ⋆i
−
2∑
i=1
∇W β¯i
ci + β¯i
− 2ψ
⋆
2∇Wψ⋆2 + θ1(∇Wψ⋆1 +∇Wψ⋆2) + θ2ζ−1V H0 hREhHREV0
(ψ¯2)2 + θ1(ψ¯1 + ψ¯2) + θ2ζ−1hHREV0W¯V
H
0 hRE
− γI +Y = 0,
(35a)
2∑
i=1
∇Qα⋆i
ci + α⋆i
+
2∑
i=1
∇Qψ⋆i
ψ⋆i
−
2∑
i=1
∇Qβ¯i
ci + β¯i
− 2ψ
⋆
2∇Qψ⋆2 + θ1(∇Qψ⋆1 +∇Qψ⋆2)
(ψ¯2)2 + θ1(ψ¯1 + ψ¯2) + θ2ζ−1hHREV0W¯V
H
0 hRE
− γI +Z = 0, (35b)
Tr(W⋆ +Q⋆) ≤ PR, Q⋆  0, γ ≥ 0, (35c)
Q⋆Z = 0, Z  0, (35d)
YW
⋆ = 0, Y  0, W⋆  0. (35e)
2∑
i=1
∇Wα⋆i
ci + α⋆i
+
2∑
i=1
∇Wψ⋆i
ψ⋆i
−
2∑
i=1
∇Wβ⋆i
ci + β⋆i
− 2ψ
⋆
2∇Wψ⋆2 + θ1(∇Wψ⋆1 +∇Wψ⋆2) + θ2ζ−1V H0 hREhHREV0
(ψ⋆2)
2 + θ1(ψ⋆1 + ψ
⋆
2) + θ2ζ
−1hHREV0W
⋆V H0 hRE
− γI +Y = 0,
(36a)
2∑
i=1
∇Qα⋆i
ci + α⋆i
+
2∑
i=1
∇Qψ⋆i
ψ⋆i
−
2∑
i=1
∇Qβ⋆i
ci + β⋆i
− 2ψ
⋆
2∇Qψ⋆2 + θ1(∇Qψ⋆1 +∇Qψ⋆2)
(ψ⋆2)
2 + θ1(ψ⋆1 + ψ
⋆
2) + θ2ζ
−1hHREV0W
⋆V H0 hRE
− γI +Z = 0. (36b)
Eq. (35a) and (35b) can be reexpressed as (36a) and (36b),
resp. Moreover, from the previous proof, we have shown
that rank(W⋆) ≤ 2. Thus, W⋆ can be decomposed as
W
⋆ =W ⋆W ⋆H for some W ⋆ ∈ C(N−r)×2. It thus follows
from (35e) that
YW ⋆W ⋆
H = 0⇐⇒ YW ⋆ = 0. (37)
By postmultiplying the both sides of (36a) with 2W ⋆, and
13
2∑
i=1
2∇Wα⋆iW ⋆
ci + α⋆i
+
2∑
i=1
2∇Wψ⋆iW ⋆
ψ⋆i
−
2∑
i=1
2∇Wβ⋆iW ⋆
ci + β⋆i
− 4ψ
⋆
2∇Wψ⋆2W ⋆ + 2θ1(∇Wψ⋆1 +∇Wψ⋆2)W ⋆ + 2θ2ζ−1V H0 hREhHREV0W ⋆
(ψ⋆2)
2 + θ1(ψ⋆1 + ψ
⋆
2) + θ2ζ
−1hHREV0W
⋆W ⋆HV H0 hRE
= 2γW ⋆
(38)
using (37), we arrive at (38). Moreover, one can verify that
the following equations hold:
2∇Wαi(W⋆,Q⋆)W ⋆ = ∇Wαi(W ⋆W ⋆H ,Q⋆) i = 1, 2,
2∇Wβi(W⋆,Q⋆)W ⋆ = ∇Wβi(W ⋆W ⋆H ,Q⋆) i = 1, 2,
2∇Wψi(W⋆,Q⋆)W ⋆ = ∇Wψi(W ⋆W ⋆H ,Q⋆), i = 1, 2.
(39)
By substituting (39) into (38), and by replacing W⋆ with
W ⋆W ⋆H in (35c) and (36b), we see that (35c), (35d),
(36b) and (38) exactly constitute the KKT conditions of
problem (13). Therefore, (W ⋆,Q⋆), together with the dual
variables γ,Z, forms a KKT point of problem (13).
E. Proof of Proposition 1
Recall φ(xk+1) ≥ φ˜(xk+1;xk) and φ(xk) = φ˜(xk;xk).
We have
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) ≥ φ˜(xk+1;xk)− φ˜(xk;xk)
≥ ζk‖∇˜φ˜(xk;xk)‖2
≥ 0,
i.e., {φ(xk)} is nondecreasing. Taking summation on both
sides of the above inequality over k from 0 to K − 1 yields
φ(xK)− φ(x0) ≥
K−1∑
k=0
ζk‖∇˜φ˜(xk;xk)‖2.
Since D is compact and φ is continuous, φ(xK) − φ(x0) is
bounded from above. Moreover, because ζk is bounded away
from zero as k→∞, it must hold that
lim
k→∞
∇˜φ˜(xk;xk) = 0. (40)
Due to the compactness of D, the sequence {xk} has at least
one limit point, say x¯. Moreover, because φ˜ is continuously
differentiable and the projection operation is a continuous
mapping [30, Prop. B.11(c)], their composite ∇˜φ˜ is a con-
tinuous mapping, which together with (40) implies
∇˜φ˜(x¯; x¯) = 0.
On the other hand, notice that
∇˜φ˜(x¯; x¯) = P
(
x¯+∇φ˜(x¯)
)
− x¯
= P (x¯+∇φ(x¯))− x¯
= ∇˜φ(x¯; x¯),
where the second equality is due to the fact that φ˜ is a partial
linearization of φ. Therefore, we obtain ∇˜φ(x¯; x¯) = 0; i.e.,
x¯ is a stationary point to problem (15).
F. Proof of Proposition 2
For ease of exposition, we prove only for the real variable
case; extension to the complex domain is straightforward.
Let us first consider the Armijo’s stepsize rule; i.e., αk,l =
(βk,l)
mk,l for some constant βk,l ∈ (0, 1), where the integer
mk,l is chosen as the smallest nonnegative integer such that
the following inequality holds [30]
φ˜
(
xk,l + (βk,l)
mk,l∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk);xk
)
− φ˜(xk,l;xk)
≥σ(βk,l)mk,l
(
∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)
)T
∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk),
(41)
for some constant σ ∈ (0, 1). Next, we bound the right-hand
side of (41) by using the following lemma [30, Prop. 2.1.3]:
Lemma 3 (Projection Theorem) Let X be a nonempty,
closed and convex subset of RN . Given some x ∈ RN and
its projection x¯ onto X , i.e., x¯ = P(x), it holds that
(x− x¯)T (z − x¯) ≤ 0, ∀ z ∈ X .
Now, by substituting x = xk,l +∇φ˜(xk,l;xk) and z = xk,l
in Lemma 3 and denoting x¯k,l = P
(
xk,l +∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)
)
,
we have
(xk,l +∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)− x¯k,l)T (xk,l − x¯k,l) ≤ 0.
Rearranging the above inequality yields
∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)T (x¯k,l − xk,l) ≥ ‖x¯k,l − xk,l‖2,
i.e.,
∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)T ∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk) ≥ ‖∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk)‖2. (42)
Combining Eqn. (41) and (42), we obtain
φ˜
(
xk,l + (βk,l)
mk,l∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk);xk
)
− φ˜(xk,l;xk)
≥σ(βk,l)mk,l‖∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk)‖2.
Recalling xk,l+1 = xk,l + (βk,l)mk,l∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk) and taking
summation over l from 0 to Lk − 1 yields
φ˜(xk+1;xk)− φ˜(xk;xk) ≥ σ
Lk−1∑
l=0
(βk,l)
mk,l‖∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk)‖2
≥ σ(βk,0)mk,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ζk
‖∇˜φ˜(xk;xk)‖2.
Assuming for now that σ(βk,0)mk,0 is bounded away from
zero as k →∞ (we will prove this shortly), we see that using
Armijo’s stepsize rule, the iteration fulfills the relation (22).
Therefore, the convergence of Algorithm 1 follows directly
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Now, we show that σ(βk,0)mk,0 is indeed bounded away
from zero as k → ∞. The proof is inspired by Propo-
sition 1.2.1 in [30]. Consider a convergent subsequence
of {xk}, denoted by {xk}k∈K, with a limit point x¯,
i.e., limk→∞,k∈K xk = x¯. Suppose on the contrary that
lim supk→∞,k∈K σ(βk,0)
mk,0 = 0, i.e.,
lim sup
k→∞,k∈K
(βk,0)
mk,0 = 0.
Hence, by the definition of Armijo’s rule, we must have for
some index k¯ such that
φ˜
(
xk,0 +
(βk,0)
mk,0
βk,0
∇˜φ˜(xk,0;xk);xk
)
− φ˜(xk,0;xk)
<σ
(βk,0)
mk,0
βk,0
(
∇φ˜(xk,0;xk)
)T
∇˜φ˜(xk,0;xk),
(43)
for all k ∈ K, k ≥ k¯. Denote pk =
∇˜φ˜(xk,0;xk)/‖∇˜φ˜(xk,0;xk)‖ and α¯k,0 =
(βk,0)
mk,0‖∇˜φ˜(xk,0;xk)‖/βk,0. Since φ˜(x;xk) is
continuously differentiable and the feasible set D is
compact [cf. Eqn. (21)], ‖∇˜φ˜(xk,0;xk)‖ is bounded, and
thus
lim sup
k→∞,k∈K
α¯k,0 = 0.
In addition, since ‖pk‖ = 1, it has a limit point. By taking
a further subsequence of K, we can assume without loss of
generality that limk→∞,k∈K pk = p¯. Now, by substituting pk
and α¯k,0 into (43), we have
φ˜
(
xk,0 + α¯k,0pk;xk
)− φ˜(xk,0;xk)
α¯k,0
<σ∇φ˜(xk,0;xk)Tpk,
∀ k ∈ K, k ≥ k¯,
which further implies
∇φ˜ (xk,0 + α˜k,0pk;xk)T pk <σ∇φ˜(xk,0;xk)Tpk,
∀ k ∈ K, k ≥ k¯,
for some α˜k,0 ∈ [0, α¯k,0] by applying the mean value theorem.
Taking the limit and noticing α¯k,0 → 0 and xk,0 = xk, we
obtain
(1− σ)∇φ˜ (x¯; x¯)T p¯ ≤ 0,
i.e.,
∇φ˜ (x¯; x¯)T p¯ ≤ 0. (44)
On the other hand, it follows from (42) that
∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)T ∇˜φ˜(x
k,l;xk)
‖∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk)‖ ≥ ‖∇˜φ˜(x
k,l;xk)‖.
By setting l = 0 and taking limit over k ∈ K, we get
∇φ˜(x¯; x¯)T p¯ ≥ ‖∇˜φ˜(x¯; x¯)‖.
Let us consider two possibilities for the limit point x¯: 1) if
x¯ is a stationary point, then there is nothing to prove and
Proposition 2 holds trivially; 2) if x¯ is not a stationary point,
then we must have
‖∇˜φ˜(x¯; x¯)‖ > 0.
Hence, ∇φ˜(x¯; x¯)T p¯ > 0, but this contradicts with (44).
Therefore, σ(βk,0)mk,0 is bounded away from zero.
For the (limited) minimization stepsize rule, the proof is
essentially the same as that of Armijo’s stepsize rule if one
notice that
φ˜
(
xk,l + ηk,l∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk);xk
)
− φ˜(xk,l;xk)
≥φ˜
(
xk,l + (βk,l)
mk,l∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk);xk
)
− φ˜(xk,l;xk)
≥σ(βk,l)mk,l
(
∇φ˜(xk,l;xk)
)T
∇˜φ˜(xk,l;xk),
where ηk,l > 0 is the stepsize obtained from (limited)
minimization rule. Consequently, the proof for (limited) min-
imization rule boils down to that of Armijo’s stepsize rule.
G. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 1. Here,
we just give a sketched proof. It is easy to verify that Lemma 1
still holds if we add the power transfer constraint (28c) in
problems (17) and (18). Moreover, notice that there are in total
8 constraints in (28); hence it follows from the rank-reduction
result [28, Lemma 3.1] that there exists an optimal (W⋆,Q⋆)
for problem (28) fulfilling
rank(W⋆) ≤
√
8 < 3.
That is, rank(W⋆) ≤ 2. The remaining proof is exactly the
same as that of Theorem 1 and thus omitted.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Kim, H. Lee, and D. Hong, “A survey of in-band full-duplex
transmission: From the perspective of PHY and MAC layers,” IEEE
Commun. Survey and Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2017–2046, Feb.
2015.
[2] G. Zheng, I. Krikidis, J. Li, A. P. Petropulu, and B. Ottersten, “Improving
physical layer secrecy using full-duplex jamming receivers,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 20, pp. 4962–4974, Oct. 2013.
[3] L. Li, Z. Chen, D. Zhang, and J. Fang, “A full-duple Bob in the
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel: Scheme and performance,” IEEE Sig.
Process. Lett., vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 107–111, Jan. 2016.
[4] R. Feng, Q. Li, Q. Zhang, and J. Qin, “Robust secure beamforming in
MISO full-duplex two-way secure communications,” IEEE Trans. veh.
Tech., vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 408–414, Jan. 2016.
[5] Y. Wang, Q. Li, Q. Zhang, and J. Qin, “Optimal and suboptimal full-
duplex secure beamforming designs for MISO two-way communica-
tions,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 493–496, Oct.
2015.
[6] F. Zhu, F. Gao, M. Yao, and H. Zou, “Joint information- and jamming-
beamforming for physical layer security with full duplex base station,”
IEEE Trans. Sig. Process., vol. 62, no. 24, pp. 6391–6401, Dec. 2014.
[7] Y. Sun, D. W. K. Ng, J. Zhu, and R. Schober, “Multi-objective
optimization for robust power efficient and secure full-duplex wireless
communication systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 8,
pp. 5511–5526, Aug. 2016.
[8] S. Parsaeefard and T. Le-Ngoc, “Improving wireless secrecy rate via full-
duplex relay-assisted protocols,” IEEE Trans. Info. Forensics Security,
vol. 10, no. 10, pp. 2095–2107, Oct. 2015.
[9] G. Chen, Y. Gong, P. Xiao, and J. A. Chambers, “Physical layer network
security in the full-duplex relay system,” IEEE Trans. Info. Forensics
Security, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 574–583, Mar. 2015.
[10] J. Lee, “Full-duplex relay for enhancing physical layer security in multi-
hop relaying systems,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 525–528,
Apr. 2015.
[11] X. Kang, C. K. Ho, and S. Sun, “Full-duplex wireless-powered commu-
nication network with energy causality,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 5539–5551, Oct. 2015.
15
[12] H. Ju and R. Zhang, “Optimal resource allocation in full-duplex wireless
powered communication network,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 62,
no. 10, pp. 3528–3540, Oct. 2014.
[13] C. Zhong, H. A. Suraweera, G. Zheng, I. Krikidis, and Z. Zhang,
“Wireless information and power transfer with full duplex relaying,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 62, no. 10, pp. 3447–3461, Oct. 2014.
[14] Y. Zeng and R. Zhang, “Full-duplex wireless-powered relay with self-
energy recycling,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 201–
204, Apr. 2015.
[15] I. Krikidis, S. Timotheou, S. Nikolaou, G. Zheng, D. W. K. Ng, and
R. Schober, “Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer in
modern communication systems,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 52, no. 11,
pp. 104–110, Nov. 2014.
[16] J.-H. Lee, “Full-duplex relay for enhancing physical layer security in
multi-hop relaying systems,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 19, no. 4, pp.
525–528, Apr. 2015.
[17] S. Parsaeefard and T. Le-Ngoc, “Improving wireless secrecy rate via full-
duplex relay-assisted protocols,” IEEE Trans. Info. Forensics Secruity,
vol. 10, no. 10, pp. 2095–2107, Oct. 2015.
[18] X. Wu, W.-K. Ma, and A. M.-C. So, “Physical-layer multicasting
by stochastic transmit beamforming and Alamouti space-time coding,”
IEEE Trans. Sig. Process., vol. 61, no. 17, pp. 4230–4245, Sept. 2013.
[19] D. R. Hunter and K. Lange, “A tutorial on MM algorithms,” The
American Statistician, vol. 58, no. 12, pp. 30–37, 2004.
[20] G. Zheng, “Joint beamforming optimization and power control for full-
duplex MIMO two-way relay channel,” IEEE Trans. Sig. Process.,
vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 555–566, Feb. 2015.
[21] Q. Li and D. Han, “Sum secrecy rate maximization for full-duplex two-
way relay networks,” in Proc. ICASSP 2016, Mar. 2016, pp. 3641–3645.
[22] R. Zhang, Y. C. Liang, C. C. Chai, and S. Cui, “Optimal beamforming
for two-way multi-antenna relay channel with analogue network coding,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 699–712, Jun. 2009.
[23] S. Alamouti, “A simple transmitter diversity scheme for wireless com-
munications,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 16, no. 8, pp. 1451–
1458, Jun. 1998.
[24] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The general Gaussian multiple access and
two-way wire-tap channels: Achievable rates and cooperative jamming,”
IEEE Trans. Infor. Theory, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 2735–2751, Jun. 2008.
[25] Z.-Q. Luo, W.-K. Ma, A. M.-C. So, Y. Ye, and S. Zhang, “Semidefinite
relaxation of quadratic optimization problems,” IEEE Signal Process.
Mag., vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 20–34, May 2010.
[26] M. Grant and S. Boyd, “CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex
programming, version 2.1,” http://cvxr.com/cvx, Mar. 2014.
[27] M. Razaviyayn, M. Hong, and Z.-Q. Luo, “A unified convergence
analysis of block successive minimization methods for nonsmooth
optimization,” SIAM J. Opt., vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 1126–1153, 2013.
[28] Y. Huang and D. P. Palomar, “Rank-constrained separable semidefinite
programming with applications to optimal beamforming,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 664–678, 2010.
[29] Y. Nesterov, Introductory lectures on convex optimization: A basic
course. Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2004.
[30] D. Bertsekas, Nonlinear Programming. Belmont, MA: Athena Scien-
tific, 1999.
[31] Q. Li, M. Hong, H.-T. Wai, Y.-F. Liu, W.-K. Ma, and Z.-Q. Luo,
“Transmit solutions for MIMO wiretap channels using alternating opti-
mization,” IEEE Journal Sel. Area. Commun., vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1714–
1727, Nov. 2013.
